Geocast into the Past: Towards a Privacy-Preserving Spatiotemporal
  Multicast for Cellular Networks by Wozniak, Sander et al.
This paper is a preprint (IEEE ”accepted” status). c© 2013 IEEE. Personal use of this material is permitted. Permission from IEEE must be
obtained for all other uses, in any current or future media, including reprinting/republishing this material for advertising or promotional purposes,
creating new collective works, for resale or redistribution to servers or lists, or reuse of any copyrighted component of this work in other works.
Geocast into the Past: Towards a Privacy-Preserving
Spatiotemporal Multicast for Cellular Networks
Sander Wozniak, Michael Rossberg, Franz Girlich, Guenter Schaefer
Ilmenau University of Technology
{sander.wozniak, michael.rossberg, franz.girlich, guenter.schaefer}[at]tu-ilmenau.de
Abstract—This article introduces the novel concept of
Spatiotemporal Multicast (STM), which is the issue of sending a
message to mobile devices that have been residing at a specific
area during a certain time span in the past. A wide variety of
applications can be envisioned for this concept, including crime
investigation, disease control, and social applications. An impor-
tant aspect of these applications is the need to protect the privacy
of its users. In this article, we present an extensive overview of
applications and objectives to be fulfilled by an STM service.
Furthermore, we propose a first Cluster-based Spatiotemporal
Multicast (CSTM) approach and provide a detailed discussion of
its privacy features. Finally, we evaluate the performance of our
scheme in a large-scale simulation setup.
I. INTRODUCTION
In this work, we introduce the novel concept of Spatiotem-
poral Multicast (STM), i.e., the issue of sending a message to
all cell phones that have been residing at a specific area during
a certain time period in the past (see Fig. 1). This concept
can be considered as an extension of Geographic Multicast
(geocast) [1], introducing the temporal aspect of sending a
geocast message “into a certain point in the past”.
We envision a wide variety of applications for the sketched
service. For example, it may be used to discover witnesses of a
crime by sending a message to mobile phones that have been
near the crime scene at the time the crime has presumably
been committed. In addition, an STM service could help
in controlling the outbreak of an infectious or contagious
disease, as carriers of a pathogen are often unaware of their
contamination. With incubation times delaying the appearance
of first symptoms several hours, days, or weeks, it is hard
to know who has been infected. While an early detection of
carriers is vital to successfully treating a disease, it is usually
impossible to quickly test large parts of the population for
infection. Assuming the area of the outbreak or the path of one
single carrier is roughly known (e.g., by evaluating the past
movement of a victim), an STM service could advise other
potential victims to seek medical attention. Finally, an STM
service may be used for mobile social networking applications,
e.g., in order to exchange information or to get in contact with
people encountered in the past. These applications could range
from exchanging pictures with fellow visitors after a festival to
dating services enabling people to meet again after a random
encounter where no contact information has been exchanged.
An important aspect of these applications is the privacy of
the users receiving STM messages. For example, a witness
may not want to reveal his presence to the crime scene to
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Fig. 1. Example for the concept of Spatiotemporal Multicast (STM).
someone else, e.g., out of fear of retaliation by the perpetrator.
A person potentially infected with a disease may want to be
alerted without having revealed his identity to someone else
than his doctor. Finally, for social applications, users may not
want to be identified by the sender or other receivers, being
free to ignore or react to the content of the message.
A naı¨ve approach for realizing a privacy-preserving STM is
to let each mobile record its own movement. Then, a sender
can deliver a message by broadcasting it to all users. A mobile
only shows the received message to its user, when its recorded
path intersects with the destination time and place. It is easy to
see that, in this scenario, a sender has to make the information
in the message available to everyone. However, a sender may
desire to keep the information confidential between him and
the users in the destination region. In this case, only users
that have actually been present in the area at the time should
receive the message. Therefore, a privacy-preserving STM
approach should deliver messages only to users having resided
in the spatiotemporal destination region.
There are several research areas related to the concept of
STM. The issue of Geographic Multicast (geocast) has been
studied extensively since the past decade [1]. Nevertheless, it
does not consider the temporal aspect of sending a message to
nodes that have been residing in an area at a point in the past.
In contrast, the concept of Just-in-time Multicast (mobicast)
does consider the spatiotemporal aspect [2]. However, its goal
is to deliver a message to a geographic area residing in the
future path of a node for just-in-time delivery. Therefore, it
only considers the temporal aspect of sending a message to an
area at a point in the future, not to the past. Furthermore, there
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exists a wide variety of research on the issue of spatiotemporal
querying and indexing structures [3], [4]. These approaches,
however, focus on the issue of efficiently querying regions in
space and time and do not incorporate the aspects of privacy or
message delivery (i.e. multicast). Finally, while there has been
some work on privacy-preserving spatiotemporal querying [5],
it does not consider the issue of privacy-preserving multicast.
Within this article we make the following contributions:
• the concept of spatiotemporal multicast is introduced,
• extensive privacy objectives are derived,
• we present a first method to realize a privacy-preserving
spatiotemporal multicast service for cellular networks,
• and evaluate it by a comprehensive simulative evaluation.
The rest of the article is organized as follows: In section II
we present objectives to be fulfilled by a STM service.
Section III describes our CSTM scheme, while a discussion of
its privacy features is given in section IV. Finally, we present
the results of the performance evaluation of our approach in
section V and conclude with an outlook in section VI.
Please note that we use the term spatiotemporal region
(st-region) to refer to a geographic area during a certain
time period. Furthermore, we use the term spatiotemporal
datagram (st-datagram) when referring to a message that is
to be delivered to users in such a st-region. For components
of the cellular network, we use the terminology of Long-Term
Evolution (LTE).
II. DESIGN OBJECTIVES
A. Functional Objectives
• Long-term support: A sender should be able to send a
message to users having resided in the area a long time
ago. Given the above mentioned applications, this time
can range from several hours or days to even weeks.
• Delivery ratio: Users present at the addressed st-region
should receive a st-datagram with high probability.
• Precision: Senders should be able to address a st-region
up to several minutes within specific radio cells.
B. Non-functional Objectives
• Delivery speed: The delivery delay (the time between
sending and receiving) should be low.
• Efficiency: The service should be efficient in terms of
computation, memory, and communication overhead. The
latter includes that only users having actually been in the
destined st-region should receive the st-datagram.
• Scalability: The objectives mentioned above should not
be significantly degraded by an increasing number of
users and senders (i.e. number of st-datagrams).
• Robustness: The service should deliver st-datagrams
with high probability despite failures of the infrastructure.
C. Privacy and Security Objectives
For user privacy, the following aspects must be considered:
• Anonymity: Attackers must not infer the identity of
users receiving a st-datagram. Otherwise, they could
unwillingly be associated with events addressed in it.
• Location privacy: Attackers must not infer the past,
present, or future locations of users up to a defined
accuracy. This is important as knowing the location
of users during the night time can reveal their home
addresses, for example.
• Co-location privacy: Attackers must not be able to
decide whether two users have been residing in the same
radio cell at the same time.
• Absence privacy: Attackers must not determine the
absence of a user from a st-region (e.g. by automatically
testing whether he receives a message addressed to this
region). This knowledge can be harmful if a user was not
at a specific st-region although he was supposed to be.
• Data confidentiality: Only users having resided in the
destined st-region should be able to read and detect the
availability of a message for this region. This is required
by some applications, as detecting an a message can
already compromise the confidentiality of the information
(e.g. in case of a rare event like the outbreak of a disease).
III. APPROACH
In this article, we propose a Cluster-based Spatiotemporal
Multicast (CSTM) approach which uses Rendezvous Points
(RPs) to deliver st-datagrams. These RPs act like mailboxes
where senders can deposit st-datagrams, allowing users to
retrieve them later by polling the RPs for the st-regions they
have been residing in. Thus, the message can also be retrieved
if the User Equipment (UE) has not been available at the
time the message has been sent. It also allows RPs to bundle
multiple st-datagrams in one packet when responding to polls.
The confidentiality of a message between a sender and its
intended receivers requires a key exchange. Since a key can
only be exchanged proactively for future messages, we use the
base stations, referred to as evolved NodeBs (eNBs), to perform
a key exchange. Therefore, the base stations generate and
broadcast tokens τ containing symmetric keys K at regular
time intervals t. Base stations generate these keys from an
initial random seed s using a Cryptographic Pseudo-Random
Number Generator (CPRNG). In order to generate these seeds,
a trusted entity is required. This entity, referred to as Token
Planning Server (TPS), is able to recover keys using its
knowledge of seeds and time slots at which keys are generated
by eNBs. Generating the keys on the eNBs has the advantage
that online interaction with the TPS is only necessary when
sending st-datagrams. Furthermore, adversaries are usually not
able to compromise eNBs without being noticed.
The UEs use the keys contained in the tokens to determine
which RPs to poll and which st-region identifiers to supply
for message lookup. UEs obtain this st-region identifier rK =
h(K) by applying a cryptographic hash function h(x) to the
key K. This identifier rK allows RPs to perform a lookup for
st-datagrams while preventing adversaries from obtaining K
using a compromised RP. In order to determine which RPs to
poll with rK , UEs apply h(x) to rK . From this RP identifier
rpK = h(rK) = h(h(K)), UEs obtain the name of the RP to
be polled. UEs compute the name by appending the number
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Fig. 2. Examples of token hierarchies in (a) space and (b) time. Each spatial
cluster and time interval shown here uses a different key. The darker areas
indicate which keys are part of a token τc,t.
rpK mod N to a known prefix, where N is the known number
of RPs. Given this name, the IP address is resolved using the
Domain Name System (DNS). This approach distributes the
load evenly among the RPs while preventing attackers from
inferring the st-regions being stored on a RP.
A potential issue of the CSTM approach is the polling
overhead. When polling RPs, UEs check for messages for all
keys contained in the tokens that they have received so far
(using st-region and RP identifiers as described above). Hence,
the polling overhead is directly related to the number of keys
a UE has received. In order to reduce the number of polling
messages between UEs and RPs, we introduce the concept
of a token hierarchy. A token hierarchy is used to aggregate
tokens over space and time (see Fig. 2), providing a tradeoff
between delivery accuracy and polling overhead (evaluated
in section V). This is achieved by distributing tokens that
consist of several different symmetric keys (one for each
level l of all λ levels of the hierarchy). The token hierarchy
L = {(l, tsl , tvl ) | 0 ≤ l < λ} defines the time slot sizes tsl
of a level and the continuous validity periods tvl = [al, bl)
relative to the time a token has been received by a UE.
Hence, a0 = 0 and ∀l, 0 < l < λ : bl−1 = al. When
polling a RP, a UE uses the key based on the time that
has passed since the reception of the token. Each level of
the hierarchy defines the validity period tv during which
the key of this level is to be used. For example, assuming
L = {(0, 10, [0, 30)), (1, 20, [30, 60)), (2, 30, [60, 90))} (times
in minutes), during the first 30 minutes after having received
the token, a UE uses level 0 when polling for messages.
Between 30 and 60 minutes after the reception, the key of
level 1 is used and between 60 and 90 minutes, the UE
uses the key of level 2. After that, the token is considered
stale and deleted by the UE. Since with increasing levels,
the granularity of the addressed st-region decreases according
to Fig. 2, the number of keys to be polled by a UE should
be decreased as well. However, in this case, the delivery
accuracy is expected to degrade. Therefore, users not having
resided in the region may receive messages not intended for
them. While decreasing the delivery accuracy is not desired
regarding the confidentiality between sender and receivers, it
improves the privacy of users by obfuscating their movement
trails according to the concept of k-anonymity.
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Fig. 3. Overview of the phases of the CSTM approach: (A) token planning,
(B) token distribution, (C) message deposition, and (D) message delivery.
Messages exchanged between entities are protected by TLS.
We now provide a detailed overview of the four phases of
the CSTM approach in the following sections (see Fig. 3).
A. Initialization / Token Planning
In the first phase, the TPS uses its knowledge of the layout
of the cellular network to generate initial random seeds sc,l
for each cell c ∈ C and level l of the token hierarchy. Here,
C is the set of all radio cells. Base stations obtain these
initial random seeds for key generation (e.g., given 3 levels, a
base station will receive 3 initial seeds). Base stations of cells
grouped in a spatial cluster at a level obtain the same seed for
this level (see Fig. 2). Finally, the TPS sends the initial random
seeds to the eNBs using a cryptographic protocol providing
confidentiality, data integrity, and entity authentication, for
example, using the Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocol.
B. Token Generation and Distribution
As mentioned above, establishing message confidentiality
requires a proactive key exchange. Hence, tokens τc,t are
distributed to all UEs in the cell c ∈ C during each time
slot t. In cell c at the beginning of time slot t, an eNB creates
the token τc,t = {(tvl ,Kc,t,l) | 0 ≤ l < λ} by generating
the symmetric keys Kc,t,l using the Cryptographic Pseudo-
Random Number Generator of level l (CPRNGl) initialized
with random seed sc,l. How often a new key is generated for
a level l depends on the time slot tsl used at this level. E.g., in
Fig. 2b, an eNB would generate a new key every 10 minutes
at level 0, every 20 minutes at level 1, and every 30 minutes
at level 2. In this example, an eNB would send the token
τc,t = {(tv0,K0), (tv1,K1), (tv2,K2)} to all UEs residing in
cell c at some time during time slot t = [20, 30).
C. Message Deposition
When a legitimate sender wants to send a message to a
specific st-region, he sends the message to the TPS, which
encrypts and distributes it to the RPs. Here, the connections
between sender and TPS, as well as between RPs and TPS
must be secured by a cryptographic protocol like TLS. The
request of the sender contains a description of the intended
st-region, for example a rectangular area and a time interval.
If the sender can be authenticated and is authorized to send a
st-datagram, the TPS looks up the initial random seeds for the
cells spatially overlapping with the destination region. Then,
the TPS uses these seeds and the known time spans tsl at which
keys are generated by eNBs to calculate the necessary tokens.
Since a token τc,t has different keys Kc,t,l, the TPS dis-
tributes the st-datagram based on the level that is currently
valid according to the validity periods tv of the levels. It
only uses keys that are currently valid and encrypts the
message with each key K. For example, given token hierarchy
L = {(0, 10, [0, 30)), (1, 20, [30, 60)), (2, 30, [60, 90))} (times
in minutes) and a token that has been announced 40 minutes
ago, the TPS will encrypt and deposit the st-datagram using
the key of level 1. According to the procedure described above,
the TPS obtains the RP identifier rpK = h(h(K)) and the
st-region identifier rK = h(K) for each key K. Again, the
hash function is necessary to enable message lookup without
revealing the key The TPS obtains the addresses of the RPs
by resolving rpK mod N via DNS, where N is the known
number of RPs. Then, for each key K, the TPS encrypts and
sends one st-datagram as well as rK to the respective RP.
Finally, the RPs store the datagrams for lookup using rK .
D. Message Delivery
UEs store the tokens received from the eNBs during their
visit in the respective cells. This trail of tokens is then used
to check for new messages at regular time intervals. When
checking for messages, for each token τc,t, a UE chooses the
key based on the level that is currently valid according to
the validity periods tv . It also obtains the st-region identifier
rK = h(K) from the key and the address of the RP rpK =
h(rK). Then, the UE sends a polling message containing
region identifier rK to all RPs rpK (one polling message
for each keys K). RPs receiving a polling message perform
a lookup for the given region identifier rK and deliver all
st-datagrams that are available. Here, the connections between
UEs and RPs are also protected by a cryptographic protocol
like TLS. Finally, UEs decrypt the received st-datagrams with
the respective symmetric key K.
IV. PRIVACY DISCUSSION
As stated in section II, we assume that potential attackers
have one or more of the following goals: to infer the identity
of users receiving a st-datagram, their locations, co-location,
absence, or a plaintext of a st-datagram for a region he has not
been residing in. Attackers may observe the communication
between entities, employ UEs, and send st-datagrams in order
to achieve these goals. More sophisticated attackers might
even compromise RPs and eNBs. However, attackers may
not compromise the TPS and obtain access to the initial
random seeds. We consider this a legitimate assumption since
it is easier to control access to one or only few TPSs,
whereas a large number of RPs may be needed for scalability
reasons. Furthermore, we assume that attackers are not able to
compromise the Packet Data Network Gateway (PGW), Home
Subscriber Server (HSS), or Mobility Management Entity
(MME) of the cellular operators. Otherwise, an adversary
would already be able to track the movement of all subscribed
users and obtain their identity. Given the above mentioned
abilities of adversaries, we consider the following four attacks
of increasing power.
A. Observation Attack
In the first potential attack, adversaries observe the com-
munication between eNB and UEs, UEs and RPs, TPS and
RPs, as well as sender and TPS. Due to the employed TLS
protocol, attackers may only violate the objectives of location,
co-location, and absence privacy of the users within the cell
he is currently residing in. This, however, is not due to the
STM service, but the possibility to directly observe users in his
surroundings. Furthermore, attackers may only infer the iden-
tify of users from their location, as inferring the identity from
IP address, International Mobile Subscriber Identity (IMSI),
or Temporary Mobile Subscriber Identity (TMSI) requires
additional knowledge from the cellular operator. Finally, due
to his presence in the cell at the specific time, an adversary
becomes a legitimate receiver. Hence, obtaining the symmetric
key K does not violate the objective of confidentiality.
B. Probing Attack
In the second potential attack, adversaries observe the
communication between TPS and RPs, as well as between
UEs and RPs. By sending a st-datagram to a specific region, he
tries to infer the RP that is responsible for the given st-region.
Then, he tries to identify users having resided at this region by
observing which UEs poll the respective RP. Here, an attacker
must be able to recognize his message among other messages
being exchanged between TPS and RPs. This, however, is only
possible if he is the only one sending a st-datagram as the
employed TLS protocol does not allow him to decrypt these
messages. Nevertheless, even if an adversary can obtain the
corresponding RP identifier rpK , he is not able to obtain the
region identifier rK due to the preimage resistance of h(x).
Accordingly, he cannot obtain K without having resided in the
intended st-region. Given these constraints, we now provide a
detailed discussion of each privacy and security objective:
1) Anonymity: In this attack, adversaries are not able to
infer the identity of users from their IP address as this requires
access to additional knowledge from the cellular operator.
2) Location privacy: Attackers are also not able to obtain
the locations of receivers as they may only learn about the
RPs that are responsible for certain st-regions. However, as
RPs are responsible for a large number of different st-regions
in an unpredictable manner according to rpK = h(rK), they
can not infer the st-regions addressed by UEs polling a RP.
3) Co-location privacy: According to the objective of lo-
cation privacy, attackers can also not learn whether two UEs
polling the same RP have been residing in the same st-region.
4) Absence privacy: Adversaries can only learn about the
absence of users from a st-region if the corresponding RP is
not being polled by a UE. This, however, is not the case as
RPs are responsible for a large number of different st-regions.
5) Confidentiality: Attackers are not able to obtain K
unless they have resided in the addressed st-region.
C. Compromising RPs
More sophisticated adversaries may also compromise one
or more RPs. This enables attackers to gain access to the
region identifiers rK mapped to this RP. However, they are still
not able to obtain the original st-regions of these identifiers
due to the preimage resistance of h(x). In order to obtain
the mapping rK → st-region, adversaries have to rely on
probing messages as described above. Therefore, they have to
guess a st-region which is mapped to the compromised RP.
Please note that guessing a st-region requires the adversaries
to actually send probing messages with different regions via
the TPS. This is due to the fact that they can not guess keys
K for regions resulting in an identifier rK = h(K) located on
the compromised RP. Furthermore, in their probing messages,
attackers have to address a single cell c during one time slot ts
to obtain a unique mapping of rK to st-region. This results in
a potentially large number of probing messages. Since authen-
ticated senders cannot perform a Sybil attack, a TPS can detect
and filter probing messages (such a mechanism is also needed
to prevent spamming and Denial-of-Service (DoS) attacks).
Moreover, due to the token hierarchy, messages are delivered
to different RPs using different st-region identifiers rK based
on the current level l. Since l depends on the time that has
passed since the destined st-region, attackers only have a
limited time for probing st-regions before a higher level and
thus different RPs are responsible. Given these constraints, we
now discuss the given objectives individually:
1) Anonymity: According to the previous attack, adver-
saries are not able to infer the identity of users from their IP
address as this requires knowledge from the cellular operator.
2) Location privacy: Attackers may be able to partially
violate the location privacy of users. This, however, requires
that they are able to obtain the mapping of rK to st-region.
Furthermore, while adversaries may infer a specific st-region
where several anonymous users have been residing, they are
not able to track their movements over several time slots and
cells unless they control all RPs. This is due to the fact that
different st-regions are mapped to RPs using h(x).
3) Co-location privacy: With this attack, the co-location
privacy of users may be violated by detecting whether two
users poll using the same rK . Nevertheless, in order to find
out if two known users have been neighbors at some time,
attackers have to be able to specifically compromise the
RP responsible for the assumed st-region of the meeting.
Furthermore, they have to know the current IP addresses of
both UEs to detect whether these UEs poll using the same rK .
4) Absence privacy: Attackers may violate the absence
privacy of users with this attack by detecting whether a user
does not poll a certain rK . However, in order to find out if
a known user has been absent from a specific st-region, an
attacker has to know the current IP address of the user and
the rK of the relevant region. Moreover, due to the token
hierarchy, attackers have to be able to specifically compromise
the RPs responsible at the current level.
5) Confidentiality: Adversaries are not able to obtain K
from rK = h(K) due to the preimage resistance of h(x).
D. Compromising eNBs
Assuming that attackers are able to compromise eNBs,
they may violate all given objectives for users in this region.
Although it may be rather unlikely for attackers to compromise
eNBs without being noticed, the approach is still able to
provide graceful degradation. Hence, the violation is limited
to the cell, affecting only st-regions after the compromise.
V. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
We evaluated the efficiency of our scheme in terms of the
polling overhead and the delivery accuracy. Therefore, we
implemented CSTM using OMNeT++ [6] and INET. We built
a simplified architecture of a cellular network consisting of
UEs, eNBs and a PGW connected to a router and the RPs.
We modelled the mobility of users using SUMO [7] and the
TAPAS Cologne scenario (between 6 and 8 am) [8]. On one
hand, we chose this vehicular scenario, because it provides
realistic mobility for a large-scale setting with over 100 000
vehicles. On the other hand, we assume that UEs travelling
at a speed of about 50 km/h present a high-load situation as
UEs receive a lot of tokens. We extended SUMO in order to
incorporate the locations of eNBs and used a Voronoi diagram
of eNB coordinates to model their coverage. In order to obtain
a trace of cell switches, we calculated the intersection between
the positions of vehicles and the Voronoi cells. We used this
simple approach, as we are not interested in the points where
UEs switch cells, but in the number of tokens that they receive.
The eNB coordinates were obtained from a website collect-
ing such locations for Germany (http://www.senderliste.de/).
We converted the given street addresses to geo-coordinates
using Nominatim (http://nominatim.openstreetmap.org) and
adjusted them to the x,y-coordinates of the Cologne scenario.
In our simulation, the 604 eNBs announced tokens
every 3 minutes or delivered them when UEs entered
their cell, whereas UEs polled RPs every 10 minutes.
We used a token hierarchy with λ = 4 levels L =
{(0, 3, [0, 15)), (1, 6, [15, 30)), (2, 9, [30, 60), (3, 12, [60, 120))}
(times in minutes). Hence, for temporal aggregation, the time
step was increased by 3 minutes with each level l (0 ≤ l < 4).
For spatial aggregation, we used random clustering to
distribute the same initial seed to the corresponding eNBs,
grouping them into random k-clusters at level l (k = l + 1).
For each of the 32 repetitions, we let a sender send
100 st-datagrams to a randomly chosen st-region (uniform
distribution). Its rectangular shape was randomly chosen any-
where in the city. The addressed time span was [a, b], where
a was randomly chosen from the interval [0, 5] and b from
[5, 10]. Hence, the duration of the st-region was between
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Fig. 4. Average number of polling messages sent by a UE.
5 and 10 minutes. The sender waited a random time between
10 and 60 minutes after b before sending the st-datagram.
We evaluated the following scenarios: (N) no token hierar-
chy, (S) only spatial aggregation, (T) only temporal aggrega-
tion, and (ST) both spatial and temporal aggregation.
First, we measured the average number of polling messages
sent by each UE as shown in Fig. 4. Since the 99 % confidence
intervals were narrow, we omitted them here. From this figure,
we can see that without a hierarchy (N), a UE usually
sends about 88 polling messages. In contrast, when employing
a hierarchy, we can see the expected decrease of polling
messages. For spatial aggregation (S), the number is reduced
to about 79 messages. We also see that temporal aggregation
(T) is more effective than (S) with about 69 messages. On
one hand, this behavior can be explained by the fact that UEs
tend to stay within the same cell for a longer time. On the
other hand, for (S), cells are only clustered randomly without
considering the road network. This may lead to cells being
grouped into one cluster, although no UEs may travel between
these cells. Finally, with both spatial and temporal aggregation
(ST), we can see a further decrease to about 65 messages.
While the token hierarchy is able to provide the ex-
pected decrease of polling messages, it should also result in
st-datagrams being received by UEs not having resided in
the intended region. Therefore, we measured both the total
number of messages being received and the total number of
false positives for all UEs. We then divided the number of false
positives by the total number of messages to obtain the ratio
of false positives. Fig. 5 shows the false positives ratio with
99 % confidence intervals and min-max-whiskers. According
to our expectations, for (N), there are no false positives.
For (S), the false positives increase to about 20 % while (T)
results in a ratio of about 27 %. Furthermore, for (ST), we
obtain the highest ratio of about 45 %. This shows the tradeoff
between the polling overhead and the delivery accuracy and
corresponds to our observation that random spatial aggregation
is less efficient than temporal aggregation. Hence, the ratio of
false positives is slightly higher for (T) than for (S).
Our evaluation shows the potential benefit of using a token
hierarchy in order to reduce the polling overhead. Therefore,
we consider finding the optimal tradeoff between the polling
overhead and the false positives ratio part of our future work.
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Fig. 5. Ratio of false positives among all messages received by UEs.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this article, we introduced the concept of STM. We
provided an extensive overview of the envisioned applications
and objectives to be fulfilled. Moreover, we proposed a first
approach to realize such a service and provided a detailed
discussion of its privacy features. Finally, we evaluated our
approach in a large-scale simulation setup. We showed the po-
tential benefit of employing a token hierarchy which provides
a tradeoff between delivery accuracy and polling overhead.
Several issues remain to be improved in further studies.
First of all, we plan to evaluate the performance of our ap-
proach regarding the functional and non-functional objectives
in more detail. Furthermore, instead of random clustering,
optimization-based clustering strategies should be considered.
Finally, we plan to investigate the potential of distributed
approaches for realizing an STM service.
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